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94 Abstract
This study theoretically and empirically analyzes the relationship between decen-
tralization and welfare. The model identifies conditions in which a decentralized 
government is utility-maximizing compared to a centralized one. The empirical 
analysis utilized data from Philippine provinces to study the relationship between 
several decentralization indicators and welfare, as measured by per capita 
income, human development index, and poverty. Results suggest that fiscal inde-
pendence, or the ability of local governments to generate their own revenues to 
finance their own expenditures rather than relying on central government trans-
fers, is positively associated with per capita income and HDI. Moreover, this rela-
tionship is stronger when governance is better and weaker among lower-income 
provinces. In contrast, a higher number of local government units per population 
is linked to adverse development outcomes, and this association is stronger among 
lower-income provinces and weaker among those with good governance.
Keywords: decentralization, welfare, fiscal independence, Philippines
1 INTRODUCTION AND OBJECTIVES
Decentralizationisoneofthemostcommonfiscalreformsamonglowandmid-
dle-income economies (Smoke, 2005; Rodriguez-Pose and Gill, 2003; Bahl,
1999).Theeconomicrationalebehinddecentralizationisthatinviewoftheprox-
imityinvolved,localgovernmentshaveaninformationadvantageoverthecentral
governmentwithrespect to thepreferencesandneedsof theconsumers(Shah,
1998;Wallis and Oates, 1988;Wetzel, 2001). It has also been suggested that
decentralizationcanhelpimproveaccountabilityandgovernance.Bybringingthe
userandtheproviderofpublicgoodsnearertoeachother,consumerscanbetter
check the performance of the government in the provision of public services
(Faguet,2009;VonBraunandGrote,2002;Usui,2007).Governanceandeffi-














































































relationship between several indicators of decentralization and some welfare
measures. It also tests if thedecentralization-welfare relationshipvaries across
governancequalityandincome.


















2.1 THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND
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96 For the second channel, decentralization can promote good governance and
improvegovernmentresponsivenessbyenhancingaccountabilityandbyincreas-
ingcitizenparticipation(Faguet,2009;Kubal,2006;VonBraunandGrote,2002;
Persson andTabellini, 2000).Accountability is enhanced because the users of
publicservicesareclosertothegovernmentagencyresponsibleandaccountable
fortheirprovision(Usui,2007).Accountabilityandgovernancecanalsoimprove




theyhavebetteraccess to resources.Theycanalsoproduce theseservicesata
lowerperunitcostbecauseofeconomiesofscaleandeconomiesofscope(Bahl,
1999;Faguet,2004;Prud’homme,1995).














ity of institutions as the most often cited intervening factors (Bardhan, 2002;
AgrawalandRibot,1999;Juttingetal.,2005;Kim2018).Goodgovernanceand










































































(1970),Musgrave (1959),Samuelson (1954;1955),andOates (2005).Another























Following Faguet (2004), the model presented here uses a quasi-linear utility
functionwherethenumeraireistheprivategood.Thedifferenceisthatthefunc-
tion for theutility from thepublicgoodwasparameterized to reflect theusual
assumptionoftheutilityincreasingatadecreasingrate.Theutilityoftherepre-
sentativeconsumer,i,is




































































output. Resources are allocated between the production of private and public
goodswhilemaximizingtherepresentativeconsumer’sutilityfunction,subjectto
the cost of producing each good and to thefixed income.The second follows









 Ui =Xi+(1–ω)θi gβ,where0 < β, ω < 1 (2)











Like theutility function, the constraint differsbetween the centralized and the
decentralizedgovernmentsetups.Followingtheargumentthatthedisadvantage
of decentralization is that the central government can produce public services
moreefficientlyduetoeconomiesofscaleandavailabilityofbettertechnologies
andinputs,theconstraintequation(3)ismodifiedforthecentralizedsetupinto
 M=X+(1–σ)Pg,where0 < σ < 1 (4)
Thevariableσrepresentsthiscostadvantageofthecentralgovernmentoverthe



































































Summary of utility functions and constraints; decentralized and centralized
Government setup Utility function Constraint
Decentralized  Ui =Xi + θi gβ(1)  M=X + P * g(3)
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100 Proposition1:If the utility function of the representative consumer under a cen-
tralized and a decentralized government setup follows (2) and (1), respectively; 
and the constraint equation under a centralized and a decentralized government 
setup follows (4) and (3), respectively, then UD* > UC* if ω >1–(1–σ)β..
Proof:The proof of proposition 1 follows the derivation above. Compute first for 
the optimal values of X and g for both the decentralized and centralized cases; 
then substitute them to equations (1) and (2) to compute for UD* and UC*. Then 









































































































2.3 THE DYNAMIC MODEL
This version has two fundamental differences from the staticmodel. First, the
outputoftheeconomyisnolongerconstant,butisafunctionofprivatecapital,k,
andpubliccapital,f;andittakesaCobb-Douglasform.Next,itisdynamicinthat




 (12)and  (13)
Theconstraintsundercentralizedanddecentralizedgovernmentsetups,respec-
tively,are
 (14)and  (15)
where0<γ,ε,σ<1;γ + ε <1
Theleft-handsideoftheconstraintequationsistheeconomy’sproductionfunc-
tion.Underacentralizedsetup,theutilityfunctioninequation(12)ismaximized
subject to theconstraint inequation(14).Underdecentralization,(13) ismaxi-
mizedsubjectto(15).
Forboththecentralizedanddecentralizedgovernmentsetups,thesolutiontothe










































































 ω > 1–(1–σ)β (22)
ThisismoreformallystatedthroughProposition2.
Proposition2:If the utility function of the representative consumer under a cen-
tralized and a decentralized government setup follows (12) and (13), respectively; 
and the constraint equation under a centralized and a decentralized government 
setup follows (14) and (15), respectively, then, at steady state, UD* > UC* if ω > 1 
–(1–σ)β.
Proof:The proof of proposition 2 follows the derivation above. Compute first for 
the optimal values of X and g under steady state for both the centralized and 
decentralized cases; then substitute them to equations (12) and (13) to compute 
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103Inaddition,thewelfarelossofadoptingthewrong(de)centralizationpolicycan
alsobecomputed.WhenUD* > UC*,thewelfaremaximizingpolicyistodecen-
tralize the government; and welfare loss from centralization is
. On the other
hand,whenUC* > UD*,thewelfaremaximizingpolicyistocentralizethegovern-
ment; and welfare loss from decentralization is  
.Thesamecomputationcanalsobeapplied
tothestaticmodel.
2.4 THE DYNAMIC MODEL WITH GOVERNANCE QUALITY
Thisversionofthemodelincorporatestheroleofgovernanceinthedecentralization-
welfarerelationship.Itconsidersthedifferenceinqualityofgovernancebetweenthe











amountofpubliccapital thatgoes toproductionand thebetter thegovernance
quality.Thelowerthevalueofφ,thehighertheinefficiencyandthepoorerthe
qualityofgovernance.
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104 Underadecentralizedsetup,theoptimizedvalues1 of gandX are









Proposition3:If the utility function of the representative consumer under a central-
ized and a decentralized government setup follows (12) and (13), respectively; and 
the constraint equation under a centralized and a decentralized government setup 
follows (23) and (24), respectively, then, at steady state, UD* > UC* if (31) holds.








































































 ω > 1–(1–σ)βJ (36)
Equations(31)and(36)showtheeffectofgovernancequalityontheconditionin
whichdecentralizationisutility-maximizing.NotethatKandΩarealwaysgreater
thanzero (as longasβ is assumed tobe<1),while the signofLdependson
whetherφd > φcorφc > φd.If,φc > φdthecentralgovernmenthasbettergovernance
qualitythanthelocalgovernments.If,φd > φctheoppositeistrue.



















































































decentralizeif thelatter’s informationadvantageismuchhigher.Alternatively, it
wouldmakesensetocentralizeeveniftheformer’scostadvantageisnotthatmuch.
Theeffectofσ remains thesame.Thehigher thecostadvantageof thecentral
governmentinprovidingpublicgoods(σ),thehighertheinformationadvantage
ofthelocalgovernmentshouldbefordecentralizationtobepreferred.3
2.5 SUMMARY OF RESULTS FROM THE MODELS
Theresultsimplythatdecentralizationisutility-maximizingcomparedtoacen-





Thehigher the additionalutility from localpublicgoodsbrought aboutby the
localgovernment’sinformationadvantageandthelowerthecostadvantageofthe
centralgovernment,thegreaterthecasefordecentralization.Inaddition,better
governance for the centralgovernment is a case for centralizationwhilebetter














3 Like in the model without governance, the welfare loss from adopting the wrong (de)cen-
tralization policy can be computed. If the welfare maximizing policy is to decentralize, wel-












































































able.Themodelsays that thedifferencein thegovernancequalitybetweenthe
localandthecentralgovernmentaffectsthelikelihoodofdecentralizationbeing
welfare-enhancingornot. If localgovernmentshavebettergovernance,decen-











conditions that make decentralization welfare- or utility-enhancing; and the
regressionanalysislooksattherelationshipbetweenthreeindicatorsofwelfare
anddecentralization.
3.2 MEASURING DECENTRALIZATION AND WELFARE
Using an appropriate decentralizationmeasure is a challenge in any empirical
decentralization study, and this ismorepronounced in country-specificpapers.
Comparingdecentralizationacrosscountriesismoredirectandstraightforward,
using such indicators as proportion of local government to total government
spending(Gemmell,KnellerandSanz,2013;Rodriguez-PoseandEzcurra,2011),
proportion of local government to total government revenue (Bodman, 2010;











































































ence of the provincial government from the central government in funding its
expenditures.Itmeasuresthelocalgovernment’sabilitytogenerateitsownrev-
enuetofunditsfunctions5.
Fiscal independence isan importantcomponentoffiscaldecentralization.Akai
andSakata(2002)arguethatevenifexpendituresharesofthesub-nationalgov-
ernmentsaresmallrelativetototalgovernmentspending,thelocalgovernmentis
still independent if its spending needs can be financed fromwithin.There are
severalreasonsforusingthisindicatorasameasureofdecentralization.First,it
measuresrevenueindependenceoftheprovincialgovernmentfromthenational
government.When locallysourced revenuesaccount fora larger shareof total
revenues and expenditures, provincial governments do not need to depend as
muchonthenationalgovernmentforfunds.Second,therearelocalgovernment
units–usuallythelow-incomemunicipalitiesorevenprovinces–thatareheavily
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consumers.This can allow local governments to provide locally suited public
goodsandservices.Ontheotherhand,toomuchdecentralizationcanleadtofrag-
























































































































Thus, GGI 2005 was matched with 2006 observations while GGI 2008 was
matchedwith2009and2012.
Equation(37)wasestimatedusingordinaryleastsquareswithheteroskedasticity-



































































3.4 RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
The regressioncoefficientsarepresented in table2.Columns1 to3of table2




and8) includes the interactiontermsbetweendecentralizationandgovernance;
andthethirdcolumn(columns3,6,and9)includestheinteractiontermsbetween
decentralizationanddummyforlower-incomeprovinces(lowinc).










indep andHDI is stronger in provinceswith better governance andweaker in
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112 significant.Thesesuggestthattheadverseeffectofsng_popnonpercapitaincome
and on HDI is weaker among provinces with good governance; and stronger
amonglower-incomeprovinces.





















An interesting result for poverty is the negative and significant coefficients of
sng_area.Thismeans that the number of local governments per population is
associatedwithhigherpoverty,butthenumberoflocalgovernmentsperlandarea
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1153.5 DISCUSSIONS AND IMPLICATIONSTheseempiricalresultssuggestseveralimplicationsontherelationshipbetween
decentralizationandwelfare.First, the relationship ismixed,dependingon the
formofdecentralizationandindicatorofwelfare.Fiscalindependence–theabil-
ityofthelocalgovernmenttogenerateown-sourcedrevenues–appearstohavea






decentralization to be effective has been emphasized in the literature (Manasan,










vices to too fewpeoplecancausea lossofefficiencyandeconomiesof scale.
Capuno(2017)furtherarguesthatpublicservicedeliveryisalreadyfragmented













One implication of the model is better governance in the local government
increases the likelihood that decentralization will be welfare-maximizing; and
bettergovernanceinthecentralgovernmentincreasesthelikelihoodthatacen-















































































Moreover, thepositive relationshipofwelfarewithfiscal independenceand its
negativerelationshipwithfragmentation(numberoflocalgovernments)suggest








is utility-maximizing compared to a centralized government setup. The main
resultsshowthatdecentralizationbeingpreferredoveracentralizedsetupdepends
onseveralkeyvariables–theutilityeffectofthelocalgovernment’sinformation




ernment’s informationadvantageand the lower thecostadvantageof thecentral
government,thegreaterthecasefordecentralization.Inaddition,bettergovernance
forthecentralgovernmentisacaseforcentralizationwhilebettergovernancefor
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overall 40,772 12,173 N= 240
between 11,652 n=  80
within  3,678 T=  3
hdi Humandevelopmentindex
overall      0.53    0.11 N= 240
between    0.11 n=  80
within    0.03 T=  3
poverty Populationpovertyincidence(in%)
overall   36.00   14.99 N= 240
between   14.28 n=  80






overall      0.18    0.16 N= 240
between    0.15 n=  80






overall      3.38    4.18 N= 240
between    4.19 n=  0






overall      6.83    5.20 N= 240
between    5.22 n=  80
within    0.00 T=  3
governance Goodgovernanceindex
overall  123.81   23.36 N= 237
between   23.46 n=  79
within    0.00 T=  3
educ Meanyearsofschooling
overall      8.24    1.11 N= 240
between    1.03 n=  80
within    0.44 T=  3
urban Percentofpopulationlivinginurbanareas
overall   25.49   22.96 N= 240
between   22.97 n=  80
within    1.95 T=  3
bankdep TotalbankdepositsinmillionsPhP
overall 15,861.98 29,186.78 N= 239
between 28,184.31 n=  80
within  7,847.41 T= 2.99
provrevpc Provincialgovernmenttotalrevenuepercapita
overall  1,293.80  1,357.46 N= 240
between  1,305.74 n=  80
within   389.86 T=  3
N = number of observations; n = number of cross-sections (provinces); T / T-bar = number of / 
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